In many diagnosis-and-repair domains, diagnostic reasoning cannot be abstracted from repair actions, nor from actions necessary to obtain information of diagnostic value. TraumAID 2.0, a consultation system for multiple trauma management, implements a reasoning architecture for exploratory-corrective domains which integrates diagnostic reasoning with planning and action. Taking the view that a diagnosis is only worthwhile to the extent that it can a ect repair decisions, its Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD) framework views the diagnosis-object as secondary to the formation of appropriate goals for a complementary planner.
Background and Motivation
In many domains, it is common to distinguish reasoning and activity concerned with what problems need to be addressed from that reasoning concerned with how to address those problems. Consequently, Arti cial Intelligence (AI) subsumes as separate sub-disciplines diagnosis research, seeking the source (or sources) of a system's faulty behavior, and planning research, concerned with the construction of action plans to achieve certain goals. Based on this dichotomy, most diagnostic programs take a diagnosis { the conjectured set of problems { as their objective.
In some domains, however, this separation may be limiting. In trauma management, for one, therapy is the ultimate objective and diagnosis is merely something that may have to be done in order to achieve that objective. We argue that, in exploratorycorrective domains such as trauma management, diagnosis should only be pursued so long as it can a ect those decisions for which it is carried out in the rst place, namely repair decisions. We will refer to this principle as the Goal-Directed Diagnosis principle. Furthermore, we believe that where activity is necessary for both diagnostic and therapeutic purposes, particularly where it is necessary to interleave the two, it may be advantageous to integrate diagnostic reasoning and planning capabilities.
Multiple trauma management is an excellent exemplar of an exploratory-corrective domain. Consider the following ( ctitious) case:
JR, a male in his early forties, was brought to the Emergency Room in an unstable condition (shock 1 ) after being shot twice in the chest. He had decreased breath sounds on both sides, and his neck veins were distended. JR also su ered from a broken arm, apparently twisted when he fell to the pavement in front of his o ce building.
The above text shows (1) that when a patient arrives in an Emergency Room (ER), the information available is often incomplete and cannot support any deep diagnosis { thus the need for exploration; and (2) that trauma management often involves multiple injuries { hence the need for intricate planning to resolve possible con icts between competing diagnostic and/or therapeutic needs.
Initial assessment showed mu ed heart sounds, but normal pulses and normal abdominal ndings. The attending physician hypothesized that the shock resulted from a tension pneumothorax 2 in one or both sides of the chest and/or from a pericardiac injury 3 . Secondary concerns were that a bullet may have injured organs internal to the chest and/or abdomen. 1 By shock we generally refer to low blood pressure. 2 A pneumothorax is a condition in which air leaks into the chest cavity between the chest wall and the lung to the point beyond which the return of blood to the heart is a ected by the resulting increase in pressure.
This part of JR's management exempli es a routine physical examination, as opposed to a more elaborate planning of costly and risky procedures. Also note that a set of potential diagnoses is identi ed { a common diagnostic practice, often referred to as hypothesis generation.
The most urgent need at this point was clearly the re-stabilization of JR. Since a tension pneumothorax was determined to be the most likely cause of shock, a needle aspiration of both sides of the chest was urgently called for. ( If that hypothesis were con rmed, a chest tube would be inserted to further ease the pneumothorax.) A needle aspiration of the pericardial sac was contingently planned, in case the shock was not relieved. Finally, X-ray studies of the chest and abdomen were planned to rule out other injuries. The arm injury was ignored at this point.
Several additional features of the multiple trauma management domain are illustrated by the above segment:
First, that active exploration is often necessary. It is important to note that diagnostic activity may a ect the patient's state in addition to one's knowledge about it. In some cases, diagnostic activity may have an adverse e ect, either directly or due to the time and resources it consumes. In other cases, a diagnostic action may also have a certain therapeutic e ect; a needle aspiration of the chest, for instance, may partially relieve an existing tension pneumothorax.
Second, with respect to the choice of diagnostic means, hypotheses may sometimes be testable in several alternative ways. For example, a tension pneumothorax can also be detected on an X-ray lm. Conversely, a single test can often provide information on more than one condition. For example, a single X-ray will often shed light on several hypotheses. Thus, in selecting a test, there may be an e ciency to be gained by selecting tests that cover a few of the hypothesized conditions. Other important factors in test selection are accuracy, expediency, the risk and pain involved, dollar cost, etc. For example, in JR's case, an invasive needle aspiration procedure was chosen over a noninvasive, but not as expedient, X-ray study.
Third, considering further interactions of competing needs, some injuries are more urgent and/or more important than others. We have just seen that urgency can a ect the choice of means (preferring more expedient procedures). Urgency and importance, however, can also a ect the order in which various needs are pursued. In the multiple trauma management domain, it is common to categorize problems as being related to either airway, or breathing, or circulation, etc. (the so-called ABC's of trauma management), and to attend to them in that order of importance. These principles lead on one hand to the immediate pursuit of the pneumothorax (urgent as a potential cause of shock and important by virtue of being an airway-related problem), and on the other hand to the neglect of the broken arm. Also notice that diagnostic tests aimed at competing hypotheses, e.g. pneumothorax and pericardial tamponade as alternative causes of shock, are sometimes ordered by their assessed likelihood.
Continuing with JR's management:
The needle aspiration of the chest came up negative for the right, but positive for the left chest. Nevertheless, despite the chest decompression, JR remained in a state of shock. The diagnostic e orts were thus shifted to a pericardial tamponade as an alternative cause of shock. In the meanwhile, a chest tube was inserted into the left chest to prevent deterioration of the pneumothorax condition. In addition to aspirating the pericardial sac, the current management plan also called for active monitoring of the chest tube (visually and via an X-ray, to see that it was correctly placed and functioning) and of the pneumothorax condition, as well as for the remaining X-ray studies. The needle aspiration of the pericardial sac proved to be e ective in restabilizing JR, implicating pericardial tamponade as the true cause of shock. JR's chest was now continuously decompressed, to allow further diagnosis until a heart surgery can be performed.
In the above segment, we see a shift of attention from a positive pneumothorax to a potential pericardial tamponade. It is an excellent example of a diagnostic action (aspiration of the chest) that \succeeded" but yet does not address completely the purpose for which it was taken. This part of the management also demonstrates occasional need to intersperse diagnosis and treatment. Intentionally incomplete treatment is also demonstrated by the temporary decompression of the pericardial sac. The de nitive heart surgery is postponed to allow further diagnosis and treatment of other injuries. This delay is also motivated by other planning principles: rst, logistically, such operation can only be done in the operating room; and second, as will soon be demonstrated, future diagnoses may require operations that could be more e ciently combined with this surgery.
While the chest tube achieved its objective of relieving the pneumothorax, the massive ow of blood from the chest indicated a massive hemothorax 4 . A left thoracotomy 5 was then planned to treat this condition. However, given the concurrent need for a heart surgery, both operations were slightly altered to include a single incision across the chest such that both the heart and the left chest cavity are exposed.
We have seen before a diagnostic action with therapeutic e ects. What we see here is an example of empirical therapy, i.e. the use of treatment as a diagnostic device by observing the patient's response. The chest tube, which was inserted for mainly therapeutic reasons, provided important diagnostic information. We also see e ciency gained by combining treatment for two problems. 4 A hemothorax is internal bleeding in the chest cavity which results in blood accumulation between the lungs and the chest, in turn collapsing the lung. 5 A thoracotomy is a chest operation.
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A chest X-ray, performed next, showed a hemothorax condition developing in the right chest, although not as massive as the one on the left. It further showed one bullet, in the chest midline. The other bullet did not appear on that lm. Two more X-rays were then taken: a lateral chest X-ray to establish the exact location of the rst bullet near the spine 6 ; and an abdominal X-ray to determine if the second bullet lodged in the abdominal cavity. At this point, the current management plan called subsequently for a urinalysis, and then for a chest surgery and a laparotomy 7 to repair the diaphragm and to explore other possible injuries in the abdomen.
An important principle demonstrated here is that of limited diagnosis. From the information available so far, the entry wounds and the bullet locations cannot be correlated with certainty. Speci cally, we are uncertain as to which of the two bullets has made its way to the heart and which headed down to the abdomen. As a result, we cannot determine which of the organs internal to the abdomen were injured; in particular, whether the left or right part of the diaphragm needs to be repaired. However, since such determination would not have a ected the management plan (it would not change the type of surgery procedure chosen { a laparotomy), it is not pursued further.
A related phenomenon, that of parsimonious repair, is also demonstrated here. A chest tube, normally inserted to treat a hemothorax, is excluded given that the patient is anyway headed for a surgery that will expose the right chest cavity.
The urinalysis test came back negative, and JR nally underwent a bilateral transverse sternotomy and a laparotomy. He was then transferred to the Intensive Care Unit for monitoring.
To summarize, this case is characteristic of exploratory-corrective domains in the kind of issues involved in reasoning and acting. It starts with incomplete information and ill-speci ed corrective goals. To decide which goals to pursue, and how to pursue them, an intelligent agent will typically have to start o with some exploration. After reaching a certain level of knowledge, such an agent will begin pursuing repair goals, while continuing exploration as necessary. What is probably the hallmark of intelligent exploratory-corrective behavior is that decisions as to whether to pursue a diagnostic test or a repair procedure, when to pursue it, to what extent, and using what means, are ultimately based on the potential e ect on repair objectives.
Our research goal was the development of a reasoning framework and of a system design methodology that address the special needs of exploratory-corrective domains, and the development of TraumAID 2.0 { a particular system for the multiple trauma management domain. TraumAID 2.0's Exploratory-Corrective Management (ECM) architecture separates a diagnostic reasoner, concerned with characterization and goal setting, and a planner, concerned with construction of action plans. This paper presents Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD), a diagnostic reasoning framework which emphasizes diagnostic and therapeutic goals as the important aspect of solving diagnostic problems. The companion planner, and other aspects of TraumAID 2.0 are discussed elsewhere 49, 50] .
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contrasts our view of the goals of diagnosis with that of related formulations. To situate GDD's reasoning style, Section 3 overviews TraumAID 2.0 and its ECM architecture. Then, in the paper's main body, Sections 4-5 present the GDD formalism and mechanisms. Section 6 suggests a design methodology for GDD-based exploratory-corrective systems. Finally, Section 7 presents a catalogue of strategies typical to exploratory-corrective domains, and shows that these can be naturally encoded using the proposed framework.
Related Formulations of the Diagnostic Task
In this section, we rst characterize the GDD framework in terms of a few commonly used dimensions. Then, we contrast our view of diagnosis-and-repair in exploratorycorrective domains, as embodied in GDD, with that taken by other researchers.
Diagnostic reasoning has been an important area of Arti cial Intelligence, and has resulted in quite a few methodologies and techniques. This large body of research is typically categorized along the following dimensions: the number of faults subject to diagnosis; the number of alternative explanations sought; in particular, whether a single explanation (e.g. most plausible, or most probable) is sought, or is it the case that all possible hypotheses that explain, or even are just consistent with the observed behavior, are of interest; what is modeled: whether an explicit (\deep") model of the diagnosed system is used (model-based diagnosis 11]), or is it a model, or imitation of the behavior of, a human diagnostician; how it is modeled: whether formal methods are used (e.g. based on logic and/or probability), or is it a model in which proven domain-speci c heuristics are encoded; whether or not new observations are actively sought: some paradigms are concurrent, that is they try to work from a given set of observations, whereas others are sequential and so guide the user in acquiring necessary information; the assumptions made about the state of the system and/or the fault: some assume a static system, whereas others model change over time, or at least allow for such change; some assume the fault is static whereas others allow for non-monotonic or intermittent faults.
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In terms of these attributes, the GDD framework is aimed at multiple fault situations. It is a discrete, logic-based, formalization of an expert's reasoning. GDD is clearly a concurrent framework since it only seeks one explanation. However, it is iteratively invoked in each cycle of the ECM architecture, to create an active sequential diagnosis and repair framework. Finally, GDD allows for non-monotonicity, but lacks explicit reasoning about change.
GDD di ers from other formulations of diagnosis in its view of the goals of the diagnostic process. Consider the following de nitions of the term`diagnosis', taken from various dictionaries: Diagnosis (Oxford Dictionary) Determining the nature of (esp. a disease) from observations of symptoms. In light of these de nitions of the term diagnosis, it is common for AI diagnostic frameworks to take a diagnosis object to be a characterization of a state of a airs, e.g. the particular fault in a device, and to take the diagnostic task to be the determination of such a characterization. In formalizing GDD, we take the di erent view that the recommendations that result from a diagnosis are important. Thus, characterization of the appropriate goals, and not merely of what is true at a given moment, is the objective of a GDD reasoner.
Poole and Provan 41] observe that the optimality of a diagnosis must depend on post-diagnosis goals. In 44], they advocate the use of utilities; in 43], they note that there is often no need for a complete explanation and that the granularity of a solution depends on its uses, and also on available tests. Leake, in his work on explanation evaluation 33], shares a similar view albeit in a di erent domain: \An explainer's reasons for explaining have profound e ects on the information that a good explanation must provide." He presents a taxonomy of explanation purposes and shows how each one results in a di erent explanation of the same event. While the GDD principle can be viewed as a utility-maximization principle, our formalization of GDD does not use probabilities, nor outcome preferences. Instead, we use a logical framework which allows some representation of uncertainty. Utility maximizing behavior is achieved by explicitly representing and reasoning about goals. In this paradigm, actions can be ruled in or out depending on interactions among competing goals and among alternative actions for addressing these goals, e.g. suppression, subsumption, compatibility, preferences, etc.
As illustrated by JR's case, diagnosis and repair are often inseparable in exploratorycorrective domains. GDD is therefore proposed as part of a total approach for diagnostic and therapeutic reasoning and activity { the ECM architecture { which combines diagnostic reasoning and planning. Recent work by Friedrich et al. 19, 20] 46, 14] . In GDD, diagnostic and therapeutic goals are treated as equals. Goals, of whichever type, are used to focus on repair-worthy issues. In the ECM architecture, direct interactions between goals of all types are resolved using GDD rules (goal-level resolution); all indirect interactions are resolved by the accompanying planner.
Finally, we noted that in exploratory-corrective domains, an agent may have to act in order to obtain diagnostic information. An important observation from the multiple trauma management domain is that such diagnostic activity may a ect the actual state of the patient and not only our knowledge about it. As evident in JR's case, in some instances the very condition a given diagnostic action attempts to diagnose may be a ected by this action. In most sequential diagnosis frameworks, the decision to act is based on the potential, or expected, discriminatory power of a given piece of information, with little or no consideration to the potential rami cations of the diagnostic activity. Some sequential frameworks use a cost measure to model the e ect of actions. However, as noted by Genesereth 23] , this approach is too simplistic. In our work, rather than worrying about more accurate models of action, we claim that diagnostic research can simply rely on properly integrating planning research. Goals, diagnostic and therapeutic, are a natural interface between a diagnostic reasoner and a planner, and are therefore singled out as the \architectural duty" of a GDD reasoner.
TraumAID 2.0: An Overview
The TraumAID project is a joint e ort between the Computer and Information Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania and the Medical College of Pennsylvania, aimed at providing computerized decision support during the initial de nitive management of trauma patients (see 54] for an overview). TraumAID 1.0, the rst generation of this program (developed between 1984-88), was a strictly rule-based program. In an empirical study, in its limited domain, TraumAID 1.0 was found to outperform surgical residents, albeit not experienced surgeons 5, 6, 7] . One of the main weaknesses of TraumAID 1.0 was its lack of adequate treatment of actions. Requests for actions were generated as a byproduct of a backward chaining on rules for suspected injuries. The signi cant interaction of actions addressing di erent injuries, cf. JR's case, has made it hard to extend TraumAID 1.0 to more body parts, and to address more complex injury patterns. In TraumAID 2.0, we aimed to remedy this weakness by adding a planning capability, and by adopting a GDD framework for the program's diagnostic reasoning component. Each consultation session in TraumAID 2.0 consists of several such cycles. In this paper, we focus on a formalization of TraumAID 2.0's GDD-based reasoning component. For description of other parts of the system, the interested reader is referred to 49, 50, 54] . TraumAID 2.0 was originally implemented in Common-Lisp on a Symbolics platform, and was recently ported by Jonathan Kaye to a Sun-based X-windows environment as well as to a Macintosh platform. The new system currently consists of some 685 rules, out of which 184 are goal-setting rules (cf. Section 5). Its planner can address 128 di erent goals, with a vocabulary of 95 di erent procedures (small plans), and 104 di erent actions (cf. 49]). On the Sun platform, each cycle of diagnostic reasoning and planning takes an average of about a second or two. Figure 2 shows a glimpse at TraumAID 2.0's screen immediately after a consultation session for JR's case. The two Given windows, at the top right, detail all information provided by the physician, voluntarily, or in response to TraumAID 2.0's plans. The Conclusions window, at the middle left, displays all conclusions made so far. During the run of the program, the Projected Goals window, just below Conclusions, presents all goals that were identi ed and that still need be addressed, whereas the Goals Pursued window, to the right of it, presents goals that have already been addressed. Another window, presenting the current management plan, is missing from the picture (at this point there is no plan). Finally, the Procedures Performed, at the bottom right, logs all procedures in the order that they have been reported done.
TraumAID 2.0's management plans have been retrospectively compared to those generated by its predecessor, TraumAID 1.0, and to the actual care on 97 real trauma cases. Three independent trauma surgeons have judged TraumAID 2.0's plans preferable to TraumAID 1.0's plans by a ratio of 62:9 with 26 ties (p <0.001 by binomial test), and to the actual care by a ratio of 64:17 with 16 ties (p <0.001). In at least two cases, it is believed that a patient's death could have been prevented had TraumAID 2.0's management been followed. In the only three cases where TraumAID 2.0's management was judged unacceptable by the judges, our domain expert (an experienced trauma surgeon himself) believes they were wrong, and/or there are disagreements between the judges themselves. The reader is referred to 8, 50] for a more in-depth description of this study, and a more detailed analysis of its results, including a critical evaluation of all cases in which TraumAID 2.0's management was judged signi cantly weaker than the actual care. 
Multi-Valued Logics
Ginsberg's Multi-Valued Logics (MVL) is a formal framework for inference in which each proposition is assigned not only a truth value, corresponding to the strength of belief in that proposition being true or false, but also a knowledge assessment, measuring roughly the amount of knowledge used in deriving this belief 24] . Bilattices in which one partial order corresponds to the truthfulness measure and the other to the knowledge assessment are used in MVL as domains.
The rst formalization of GDD 48] used a three-valued logic in which each proposition was assigned a true, false, or unknown belief. Here, we present an MVL-based reformulation of GDD, the immediate result which is the ability to consistently extend the inference paradigm to more expressive domains. In Section 5.3, we show this to be useful in explicitly representing and reasoning about contradictory information. In 50], we outline an extension which facilitates reasoning with defaults.
In this new formalization of GDD, each proposition is assigned a value drawn from the cross product of two bilattices: one representing belief, the other representing attitude. The notion of belief is interpreted regularly, representing one's belief in whether a certain propositional statement is true or not. The attitude component is used to represent problem-solving control information and measures the relevance of acquiring information about, or achieving the condition described by the particular proposition. The belief bilattice still has the truthfulness and knowledge partial orders whereas the attitude bilattice has relevance and knowledge dimensions. Within Ginsberg's paradigm, domain knowledge is expressed using general rst-order formulae, and thus requires an underlying theorem prover. In contrast, TraumAID 1.0 used a rule-based representation. In formalizing TraumAID 2.0, rather than adopting Ginsberg's formulation in full, and then having to completely reconstruct the domain knowledge, we have specialized MVL to the rule-based case. Besides tting our needs, we believe that the specialized theory may be useful for others wishing to convert other rule-based systems to MVL. While the material presented next is self-contained, the reader is referred to 24] for a more complete coverage of MVL.
Attitude and Belief
As mentioned, throughout the whole diagnosis-and-repair process, the GDD reasoner maintains and updates an attitude and a belief for a set of propositional statements. To remain general, propositions are taken to be any fact about the patient or the world that the reasoner may know to hold, may know not to hold, may assume, may want to know whether holds, may want to achieve, may be confused about, etc. The problem solver's belief in whether a proposition holds is separated from its attitude towards acquiring such knowledge, e.g., the perceived relevance of determining whether or not a patient su ers from a pericardial tamponade is separated from the belief about the patient's condition. The problem solver's attitude towards and/or belief in a given proposition changes over time due to new information becoming available, new inferences being drawn, activity being carried out, etc.
De nition 4.1 A Lattice
A lattice is a triple (L,^,_), where L is its domain,^(\meet") and _ (\join") are binary operations from L onto itself that are 1. idempotent, i.e. a^a=a, a_a=a; 2. commutative, i.e. a^b=b^a, a_b=b_a; 3. associative, i.e. (a^b)^c=a^(b^c), (a_b)_c=a_(b_c); and 4. obey the absorption laws, i.e. a^(a_b)=a, a_(a^b)=a.
Alternatively, a lattice can be de ned as a partially ordered set, any two elements of which have a greatest lower bound (glb) and a least upper bound (lub). The two definitions coincide by taking lub(a; b) = a _ b, and glb(a; b) = a^b. A lattice is said to be complete if lub and glb can be de ned for any subset of the lattice's elements. Thus, any lattice with a nite domain is complete.
De nition 4.2 A Bilattice
A bilattice is a sextuple (B,^,_, ,+,:) such that: Ginsberg discusses bilattices that are based on two partial orders: truth-wise ( t ), and knowledge-wise ( k ). That is, each proposition is described by how strongly we 13 believe it is true, and by how much knowledge was involved in inferring this belief. The smallest nontrivial bilattice ( Figure 3 ) has four points: T (absolute truth), F (absolute false), U (unknown), and ? (contradictory). In that bilattice, the t partial order de nes one lattice (B,^,_), whereas the k de nes another lattice (B, ,+). Other bilattices may contain more, or even an in nite number of points. In any truth-knowledge bilattice, negation reverses the truth capacity of a proposition, leaving its knowledge capacity unchanged. In particular, within the 4-point bilattice, : maps T to F and vice versa, leaving U and ? untouched.
Two, possibly distinct 8 For most of this paper, we will presume both B A and B B to be 4-point bilattices such as those in Figure 4 . The belief bilattice, following Ginsberg's suggestion, is de ned by the truth-knowledge partial orders. In the attitude bilattice, a proposition is described by its relevance ( r ) and the knowledge used to derive this relevance ( k ). Note that one's knowledge with respect to the truthfulness of a proposition need not equal one's knowledge with respect to the relevance of that same proposition. The extreme points in the belief bilattice are labeled T and F, whereas same points are labeled R (for relevant) and I (for irrelevant) in the attitude bilattice. Extensions to more complex bilattices, in which defaults can be represented are discussed in 24, 50].
Interpreting an Attitude-Belief Assignment
Throughout all stages of a given diagnosis-and-repair session, an attitude-belief value is assigned to all propositions known to the system. This attitude-belief assignment is updated whenever, and in accordance with (i.e. re ecting inference), any new information which becomes available.
Semantically, belief assignment to a given proposition is interpreted as an assessment of whether or not we believe the statement denoted by this proposition holds or not. For example, if B (Hemothorax)=t, then we believe that the patient su ers from a hemothorax. Similarly, if B (Hemothorax is Relieved=t, then we believe that the hemothorax has in fact been relieved.
The notion of \goal" is derived from the attitude assignment to a given proposition. Generally speaking, a proposition p is a goal if its attitude assignment is high on the relevance partial order (in our 4-point bilattice if A (p)=r). Note that there is no syntactic distinction between a diagnostic (knowledge seeking) and a therapeutic (state achieving) goal. For example, the relevance of knowing whether or not a patient su ers from a hemothorax is indicated via the attitude assignment A (Hemothorax)=r, and similarly the relevance of achieving a state in which the hemothorax is achieved is indicated via the attitude assignment A (Hemothorax is Relieved)=r.
Of course, not every relevant proposition becomes automatically an operational goal. For example, if B (Hemothorax)=t then it is already believed that the patient does su er from a hemothorax and thus, as a knowledge goal, it is already satis ed. An important distinction between a diagnostic and a therapeutic goal is that while the former is often regarded satis ed whenever any concrete belief can be assigned to the given proposition, the latter is only achieved when a positive determination is made. For example, the Hemothorax goal is satis ed when it is assigned a belief value of either t or f, whereas the Hemothorax is Relieved goal is only satis ed when it is assigned a belief value t.
In general, in more complex bilattices, one has to de ne which combinations of relevance and achievement levels need be addressed, in what order of preference, etc. However, since its inference is purely syntactic, the GDD reasoner is indi erent to these semantic subtleties. Within the ECM architecture, it is the planner's role to decide which goals to pursue.
goal-setting rules represent conditions under which speci c diagnostic and/or therapeutic goals should be pursued. We start with a simple representation scheme for diagnostic problems, and a corresponding inference procedure. Then, we extend both to allow for explicit representation of contradictory information. Finally, we explain what we take to be a solution to a diagnostic problem, and the role it plays in the operation of our ECM-based system.
Rules
In GDD, we use rules to represent knowledge. Two types of rules are used: one for inferring belief, the other for inferring attitude. Antecedents in both types of rules are stated in belief terms, and are interpreted conjunctively. A rule's consequent can be either a proposition p or its negation :p. An inference procedure speci es the way in which a rule's antecedents are combined to infer a belief, or an attitude, for its consequent.
De nition 5.1 An Antecedent
An antecedent is recursively de ned as either:
1. a proposition h; 2. relevant(h), where h is a proposition; 3. :a, where a is an antecedent; 4. true(a), false(a), unknown(a), or contradictory(a), where a is an antecedent; or 5. known(a), unless(a), or compatible-with(a), where a is an antecedent.
De nition 5.2 Rules
A rule R has two parts: a body, or a premise, which is a set of antecedents, and a consequent which is a single proposition. Let Ant i denote an antecedent, and let d denote a consequent. GDD has two types of rules:
1. Evidential rules are used to de ne and compute belief. Its informal interpretation is that in case of thoracic aortic injury, if there is loss of motor in both legs, and the vertebra is not fractured, then one can conclude that the loss of motor is due to an ischemic spinal cord injury.
2. Goal Setting rules are used to de ne and compute attitude. They map evidence and conclusions to attitude and take the form: Ant 1^A nt 2^: : :^Ant r > d. For example, the following goal-setting rule concludes whether it is relevant to know whether a patient has hematuria 9 .
Gunshot wound to abdomenB ullet in abdomen > Hematuria Its informal interpretation is that in case of a gunshot wound to the abdomen, if the bullet remains in the abdominal cavity, then one should also investigate the possibility of a hematuria.
A single fact may often be proved, or ruled out, in several alternative ways. Similarly, a goal may need to be set in a variety of contexts. The same conclusion can therefore be drawn through di erent evidential rules, and the same goal can be set through di erent goal-setting rules. Conversely, the same proposition p can be the consequent of both goal-setting and evidential rules. In particular, a goal-setting rule for p is used to convey that it is worth acquiring knowledge about p or that it is worth achieving a state in which p holds (depending on p's semantic interpretation as a diagnostic or repair goal). An evidential rule for p is used to conclude whether or not it holds, or put di erently whether or not it has been satis ed.
Example 5.3 Consider the diagnosis and repair of a pericardial tamponade, throughout which process the following diagnostic and therapeutic goals are instantiated, addressed, and satis ed:
1. Rules for setting a diagnostic (knowledge) goal:
The need to investigate a pericardial tamponade will rst be triggered by such observations as mu ed heart sounds or observable injury to the sternum, and rules of the form: (: : :) > Pericardial Tamponade \It is relevant to know if the condition holds".
Rules for satisfying a diagnostic (knowledge) goal:
This diagnostic goal will then be addressed by the planner, recommending an ultrasound e usion or a needle aspiration of the pericardial sac, depending on the patient's state. Such test will then be incorporated into the overall plan, considering other concurrent needs as well. Whenever taken, results from this test will serve to determine whether or not the patient su ers a pericardial tamponade, using rules of the form:
(: : :) ) Pericardial Tamponade \Conclude whether the condition holds".
Rules for setting a therapeutic goal:
If the patient is determined to su er a pericardial tamponade then, possibly depending on other conditions s/he may su er, a therapeutic goal of treating the condition may be set, using rules of the form: (: : :) > Relieve pressure pericardial sac \It is relevant to address the condition".
Rules for satisfying a therapeutic goal:
The actual results of the treatment will then be used to determine whether or not it was successful, using rules of the form: (: : :) ) Relieve pressure pericardial sac \Conclude whether the condition has been successfully addressed".
Note again that there is no syntactic distinction between the encoding of rules used to set knowledge goals and conclude that they are satis ed, and that of rules used to encode the same for state achieving goals. The sole distinction between diagnostic and therapeutic goals is a semantic one. A goal's nature a ects what is done when it is set, and the conditions under which it can be regarded satis ed. In the ECM architecture, both are to be determined by the planner.
While rules used by GDD to express knowledge have their antecedents expressed solely in belief terms, it may often be useful to predicate whether a proposition is a goal based on the relevance (or lack thereof) of another goal. To facilitate this within a belief-based antecedent calculus, we add a mapping from the attitude bilattice to the belief bilattice (denoted attitude-to-belief), roughly modeling the belief in the relevance of a given proposition.
Generally, a natural such mapping is clear when B A and B B are isomorphic. Otherwise, one has to make sure that no important relevance information is being lost in the transformation.
A Basic Form of Inference
In each cycle of the ECM architecture, a new diagnostic problem is de ned by the set of rules, and the current known observations. Belief predicates map belief-terms to fT,Fg and are useful where reasoning in absolute terms is necessary. Examples of this are presented in Sections 5.3, and 6.1. Thus, note that h and true(h) are interpreted di erently and the same is true of :h and false(h). Also note that :known(h) refers to any situation in which a concrete belief cannot be reached whereas unknown(h) describes the particular situation in which h is assigned a belief value U, denoting lack of information. In the basic bilattice, ? is also categorized as :known(h); in Section 5.3, we will use ? to denote unknown due to co-presence of contradictory information.
De nition 5.6 Belief Assignment for a Rule's Body Let h A ; B i be our current attitude-belief, and let R be a rule with a collection fAnt i g k i=1 of antecedents in its body. We will interpret a rule's body as a simple conjunction by de ning: In general, there is no guarantee that a consistent inference is unique or computable, or even that it exists. Nevertheless, we will soon present a simple procedure which starts with an initial attitude-belief which re ects all observations, and iteratively updates it to comply with all rules and observations (Algorithm 5.12). In our experience, using this algorithm, TraumAID 2.0 typically solves a single diagnostic problem in less than a second.
Representing and Reasoning about Contradictory Information

Motivation
Notice that even though ? is part of both the belief and the attitude bilattices, it cannot be assigned to a proposition in the framework developed thus far; this follows directly from the fact that propositions are never initialized with ?, the fact that truth assignments are computed using _ and^only, and the fact that ? is not in the closure of fT ; F; Ug under^and _. On one hand, this is a good feature of the representation and inference scheme. Indeed, Ginsberg notes that ? tends to \pollute" an interpretation; when ? is assigned to one proposition, it will often propagate to many other dependent propositions. On the other hand, we will soon argue that ? can serve the important role of keeping an explicit record of contradictory evidence. We will make a few technical suggestions how to overcome the pollution problem. Consider two alternative methods used by TraumAID 2.0 to diagnose a tension pneumothorax (tp) 10 :
1. X-ray shows Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S) ) Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S) 2. Needle aspiration shows pressure in chest(Side=S) ) Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S) Note: Both ndings, and the diagnosis, can relate to either the right or left of the patient. The (Side=S) notation forces same side conclusion, and is implemented using uni cation.
If one follows a con rmation strategy, a positive result in one test justi es a diagnosis. However, what if one test is negative, and the other has not been taken? By the semantic interpretation of the above rules, tp is unknown (computed as F_U). It is not proven, but cannot be dismissed since not all means have been exhausted. On the other hand, in standard medical practice, a negative test su ces to rule out tp so long as no other indication contradicts these test results. Furthermore, it is medically incorrect to perform the other test just for complete vindication. Insofar as this other test is not performed, providing contradictory evidence, tp should be assumed absent (note the non-monotonicity). This reasoning may be encoded in the following augmented GDD rules: With the addition of a new antecedent, each of these rules will now fail if either test is negative. Otherwise, if either or both tests are positive, and there is no contradictory evidence, tp is safely concluded positive. Now consider the case in which the two tests are performed and provide contradictory evidence. Given the rst set of rules, tp will be concluded. Given the modi ed set, both rules will fail: one due to the explicit requirement for a positive result, the other due to the compatibility requirement. tp will thus be concluded absent. However, although it may well be the case that tp is indeed absent, in such instances medical practice defaults to treatment as if tp was present.
So far, a proposition was labeled true or false if it was so asserted or concluded. It was labeled unknown if it was not reported and could not be concluded. In other words, unknown arose from lack of knowledge. Contradictions belong to a di erent class of unknowns. Commonly arising in practice, while themselves representing an inconsistency (either in what one observes or in one's interpretation of what one observes), it is important to represent and cope with contradictions in a consistent manner. Next, in order to do so, we rst extend rule representation to allow explicit negative conclusions, and then generalize the inference accordingly.
Extended Representation
Reconsidering the original set of rules for tp, two rules can be added in which tp is ruled out whenever either of the two tests indicates its absence: tp is now concluded if either test is positive, while :tp is concluded if either test is negative. A con ict arises if we want to interpret :tp as the negation of tp, namely when both tests are taken and one succeeds whereas the other fails. In such instance, both tp and :tp will be assigned a truth value T. Ginsberg suggests a more general rst-order framework under which con icts can be represented. The extended form of inference presented next is a specialization of his approach to the propositional rulebased case.
Extended Inference
Having extended the representation language, we must now rede ne inference to allow for rules that explicit falsify a proposition and for the need to combine positive and negative contributions. In 24], the full rst-order formulation of MVL assigns to a statement a truth-value that combines the results of all possible proofs for that statement and its negation. Theoretically, such determination may be undecidable; in practice, it may often be intractable, or at least very expensive. In contrast, in the propositional rule-based case, proofs need not be searched for since they are given explicitly by the corresponding rules.
In the new de nition of consistent inference (De nition 5.9), the body of each rule for a given proposition p or its negation :p is rst evaluated. The resulting values for p and :p are then combined using the + operator. This interpretation is natural because one can view each rule as a separate argument for or against p. Combining them is thus a synthesis of knowledge sources, and + is the operator that \adds" along the bilattice's knowledge dimension. Since conditions for both p and :p are speci ed explicitly, \negation as failure" is unnecessary. To avoid negation by failure, each rule's body is padded with U. Thus, a proposition p evaluates to F only if at least one of the rules for :p succeeds, but not necessarily when all rules for p fail. 
Using the above inference scheme and the four rules for tp, a positive determination (T) will be made if either or both tests come up positive. A negative determination (F) will be made if one test is negative and the other is either negative or has not been taken. Finally, if the two tests contradict each other, then tp will be assigned a ? value.
Dealing With Contradictions
Two major concerns need to be addressed in representing and reasoning about contradictory information. The rst problem concerns the semantic interpretation of a contradiction. Let p be a proposition for which a contradiction (?) has been inferred. (We discuss belief, but similar considerations apply to attitude.) Consider rules whose antecedents refer to p. The yield ? when evaluated on ?, and thus propagate it. This is the \pollution" phenomenon.
Prior to assessing the rami cations of pollution, consider the problem of what to do when a proposition is assigned ? as a belief. Unfortunately, the answer varies. In some cases, a positive (or negative) default is appropriate. In other circumstances, none of the conclusions can be safely made and further investigation is warranted. When tests have low reliability, for example, a third test may be taken or one of the tests may be repeated. In yet other cases, a conclusive decision may be irrelevant (e.g. vis-a-vis the GDD principle), or a default to a particular treatment (without necessarily making the uncertain conclusion) may be preferred. For example, when diagnosing tp, one will default to treating as if tp was positively diagnosed. Note however the distinction between defaulting to positive conclusion versus defaulting to positive treatment.
The GDD principle frees us from resolving irrelevant contradictions. Otherwise, the contradictory predicate can be used to explicitly specify the desired behavior. For example, the following rule concludes the need to treat as if tp is positive: contradictory(Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)) > Rx Tension Pneumothorax (Side=S) As for the pollution problem, it is insigni cant when the polluted proposition has no dependents, or when all such dependents are irrelevant. Otherwise, a ? belief must simply be tolerated as a type of unknown. If well programmed, pollution of relevant propositions in the ECM architecture is by de nition a temporary phenomenon whose resolution is attempted in subsequent cycles. Finally, the spread of pollution can be technically blocked by padding rules with antecedents of the form :contradictory(p) where p is a proposition which may be polluted.
Solving Diagnostic Problems
While our de nition of the diagnostic problem (De nition 5.4) is fairly traditional, it is the formal de nition of a solution which di erentiates the GDD framework from other formulations of diagnosis. Let us rst de ne a diagnosis:
De nition 5.10 A Diagnosis
Let h A ; B i be an inferential closure for a diagnostic problem P, then B , its belief part, is a diagnosis for P.
Indeed, most formalizations of diagnosis take a diagnosis as their solution. In GDD, however, we associate more importance with the goals (and consequently the actions) adopted during the diagnosis process. We shall therefore de ne a solution as follows:
De nition 5.11 A Solution
A solution to a diagnostic problem P is the complete inferential closure h A ; B i.
Consider again Example 5.8, where it is unknown whether or not the patient su ers an ischemic spinal cord injury. The diagnosis may thus be considered de cient in that regard. However, if according to the goal-setting rules for this particular situation, A (Ischemic spinal cord injury)=i (irrelevant), or even u (unknown), then it may not be relevant and the solution is thus satisfactory. This use of relevance is reminiscent of its use in AMORD 12] to guide a problem solver to more promising or important reasoning paths. Here, however, we are less concerned with controlling reasoning, but rather in controlling action.
Goals serve as an intermediary between diagnostic reasoning and action. Thus, in the ECM architecture, solving the current diagnostic problem has an operational purpose: it de nes the goals to be pursued next by the planner and hence the actions that will be taken. In the ECM algorithm (Algorithm 5.12), the GDD reasoner is invoked whenever new information is acquired. The solution it provides is subsequently used to guide the planner in the choice of activity which, in turn, may provide new information to start a new cycle. Note that the termination criterion is not necessarily related to the completeness of of the working diagnosis. The process terminates when the plan is empty, i.e. when all goals have been addressed, or when no means are available for addressing remaining goals. On the other hand, while goals are the \architectural duty" of the GDD reasoner, the belief part of the solution (characterization) is still important serving two purposes: rst, to human users, it is useful for the system to be able to explain its decisions. Second, beliefs can be useful for planning separate from the goals they give rise to, as they might a ect choice of means and/or ordering decisions.
A Design Methodology for GDD-based Systems
We have so far discussed the formalism and function, but not the use, of GDD. In this section, we propose a design methodology for GDD-based systems. Speci cally, in accordance with the ECM architecture's decomposition of the reasoning task, we propose that 1. local patterns of behavior (or strategies) be explicitly encoded (a) in GDD rules, using goals as milestones and choice points, and using goalsetting and evidential rules to represent progress within a local strategy; (b) in the planner, via pre-de ned local procedures (sequences of actions that can be used to locally satisfy a given goal), and via mappings from goals to a set of alternative procedures, ordered by their respective local preference for the given goal (i.e. independently of other needs); 2. constraints and preferences on combinations of goals, procedures, and actions, be speci ed as much as possible in the form of general principles; given a combination of goals, these principles be used by the planner to implicitly merge a corresponding combination of local strategies.
TraumAID 2.0's planner, using a selection-and-ordering plan sketching algorithm 49], is one planner that satis es the above requirements. Next, we rst introduce goal inhibition { a macro mechanism useful in encoding local strategies and some of the interaction of these strategies. We then discuss, and present an example of the encoding of local strategies. Finally, we discuss and illustrate some of the principles and means for combining local strategies for multiple concurrent goals.
Goal Inhibition
We intend to use GDD rules to encode strategies { ways in which an agent is to respond to various situations in which s/he may nd themselves. Usually, strategies are designed constructively. However, the on-going interplay between diagnosis and therapy in trauma management may sometimes require that pursuit of certain goals be delayed, or even inhibited. While goal interaction is naturally addressed by a planner, planning is notoriously complex and so it may be advantageous if unnecessary or non-contributing goals can be inhibited before they are passed on to the planner. This is the purpose of goal inhibition rules.
The basic approach to goal inhibition is to qualify goal-setting rules by the negation of applicable inhibition conditions. Consider, for example a patient with a right lumbar wound. Normally, such injury would suggest a possible duodenal injury:
Right lumbar wound > Duodenal injury A standard test for duodenal injury is a CT scan. However, this lengthy and costly procedure should not be pursued once a need for a laparotomy has been established since the surgical procedure will expose the duodenum anyway. Thus, we can qualify the above rule as follows Right lumbar woundû nless(Laparotomy required) > Duodenal injury While correct, the problem with such inhibition scheme is that if the inhibition condition is complex, rules become even more complex and hard to maintain. In addition, overloading rules makes them less interpretable since the distinct function of each of a rule's antecedents becomes unclear (cf. 2]). Instead, inhibiting relationships between goals and between goals and conclusions can be speci ed separately, and then compiled into each goal's rules.
De nition 6.1 Goal Inhibition Clause
Given a goal g, inhibit(g) speci es the condition(s) under which g has to be inhibited.
In the above example, one can then write a rule:
Laparotomy required ) inhibit(Duodenal injury)
One way to compile inhibition information into the rules is to pad every goal-setting rule for a goal g as follows. Let body(R) be the original body of a goal-setting rule R, replace body(R) with body 0 (R) def = body(R)^:true(inhibit(g)) A more elegant alternative approach to goal inhibition is based on the extension of GDD proposed in Section 5.3. In the extended framework, a goal-setting rule with a negative consequent can be thought of as representing an argument against pursuing that goal which is exactly what we mean by inhibition. Taking that view, a goal inhibition rule is considered together with all reasons for its pursuit. Under this approach, goal inhibition rules are constructed as follows. Let g be a goal, and let inhibit(g) be an inhibition clause for g. Add a goal-inhibition rule:
inhibit(g) > :g In our previous example, we will write: Laparotomy required > :Duodenal injury Under the inference procedure of Section 5.3, a contradictory attitude (?) will be assigned to a goal for which both a goal-setting and a goal-inhibition rule have succeeded.
A third approach to e ectively inhibit goals which is sometimes preferable in implementing diagnostic strategies is to \force" a concrete value (i.e. T or F) on the goal's underlying proposition. The net e ect of this approach is that the goal remains relevant, but is regarded achieved by the planner and thus not actively pursued. This approach is likely to be preferable when a belief in the inhibited goal's status can be inferred from the inhibiting condition (cf. Example 6.2); otherwise, this approach may be inelegant.
Local Strategies
In programming arti cial agents, we try to provide them with a strategy { the capability to respond appropriately to each of the situations in which they may nd themselves. A strategy can be represented explicitly, e.g. enumerating states and responses; implicitly, e.g. as a procedure to compute a response from a state's representation; or as a combination of explicit and implicit representations. In general, di erent representations of strategies follow from di erent tradeo s between the time and space needed to construct, represent, and use a given strategy.
In many domains, trauma management included, an agent's task can be broken down into a combination of several sub-tasks, each of which is not very complex. The complexity of the overall strategy in such domains is thus the result of the potential interactions between sub-strategies. We propose that in such domains it may be useful to explicitly specify each of the sub-strategies, while using more implicit reasoning to compute contextually appropriate responses to combinations thereof. This approach is particularly useful in domains in which a large number of sub-strategies are potentially applicable but only a few, albeit possibly di erent ones each time, are likely to be concurrently pursued. We call each of these sub-strategies a local strategy.
In the trauma management domain, strategies can be localized around individual problems, e.g. the diagnosis-and-repair of a tension pneumothorax. Local strategies can also be organized around a certain resource or expertise, e.g. planning a series of X-rays vs. planning an operation, or describing work done by a physician vs. that done by a nurse. Localization is often domain-speci c, and one may therefore have to rely on an expert's intimate knowledge of the domain. The use of localized strategies is a simple matter of divide-and-conquer and so it can also accommodate automatically generated sub-plans (as in 18, 32, 56]), as well as combinations of automatically generated subplans and explicitly speci ed sub-strategies.
An important distinction of our local strategies is that while inference-responses are explicitly speci ed in GDD rules, action-responses are not. Instead, a local strategy's GDD rules are used to specify goal-responses. A set of alternative procedures/actions that can be used with the intention of satisfying these goals (and thereby bringing about the local strategy's next state, or conclusion) is speci ed for the planner.
From a design perspective, there are two advantages here. First, it is not required that action-responses, eventually computed from goal-responses, necessarily achieve a pre-determined e ect. One can assess any outcome. Second, goals serve as choice points in a local strategy. The fact that a goal can sometimes be addressed with multiple alternative courses of action adds to the planner's ability to take advantage of synergy in merging several local strategies. In addition, goal inhibition may sometimes help in relieving some of the computational complexity of planning.
Example 6.2 Diagnosis-and-Repair of a Tension Pneumothorax
Recall that JR was suspected to have su ered a tension pneumothorax (tp). Diagnosis of tp follows a general strategy which we call scaled diagnosis where diagnostic activity proceeds cautiously by rst acquiring information of lower cost. Consider the rules in Figure 5 , presenting a simpli ed version of TraumAID 2.0's strategy 11 . Diag- nosis starts with a report of a chest wound. Rule 400 initiates the rst diagnostic goal, Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax (ptp), by labeling its attitude R. When this goal is referred to the planner, it will ask whether the patient is in shock and/or whether the patient su ers from distended neck veins. If positive, any of these ndings will con rm a ptp, instantiating the next diagnostic goal: Likely Tension Pneumothorax (ltp). Note that if it was immediately volunteered that the patient was in shock, then reasoning could immediately \leap" to that latter stage. If that was the case, then ptp's attitude would still have been labeled R, but it would not have been pursued since it would have already been believed to hold. To pursue ltp, the planner will ask to assess patient's breath sounds. The nal diagnostic goal, labeled accordingly Tension Pneumothorax (tp), will then be instantiated if ltp is con rmed. Figure 6 presents the nal diagnostic stage, which we have already discussed in Section 5.3. Recall also that the therapeutic goal Rx Tension Pneumothorax (rtp) was recommended both when tp was con rmed, and also when there was contradictory evidence with respect to its presence. Figure 6 : Diagnosis of Tension Pneumothorax: alternative diagnostic tests, and therapeutic recommendation. Figure 7 describes the therapeutic part of that strategy (or more precisely the part that recommends therapeutic goals, and evaluates whether or not these goals have been satis ed by previous actions). Notice that therapeutic goals are only labeled satis ed when there is actual evidence to that e ect. Also note that there are two therapeutic goals, depending on whether the patient is stable or not. Finally notice the interaction of the therapeutic sub-strategy with the diagnostic sub-strategy in cases where a needle is used in the latter: a patient that was diagnosed through a needle aspiration does not need further decompression.
In this case, we have encoded goal inhibition knowledge by allowing lower-level goals to be subsumed by their successors whenever the latter are concluded directly ( Figure 8 ). As noted, other strategies may use di erent schemes.
Implicitly Combining Local Strategies
The way in which local strategies are combined in the ECM architecture is implicit in two ways. First, the combined strategy is never represented explicitly. Rather, it is constructed on the y, as it is executed. Second, for the most part, what is encoded are combination principles, as opposed to a recipe as to how to merge any particular combination of strategies. Strategies can be combined on two levels:
1. On the goal-level, one can specify when a certain goal suppresses, inhibits, or is ; if a needle was used for diagnosis then already decompressed.
801 Needle_Aspiration_Chest_For_Pressure (Side=S) => Decompressed_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S)
; that's not a good way to do it, but will achieve the goal. prioritized with respect to another, and when a certain combination of goals can be replaced with a generalizing goal or set of goals; 2. On the procedure/action-level, one can specify a preference for one procedure over another with respect to a certain goal; a preference for a certain combination of procedures for a certain combination of goals (e.g., a \cost" minimization criterion); and compatibility and ordering constraints between two or more procedures or actions.
Again, the interested reader is referred to 49, 50] for details about the ECM planner.
Combining in the Goal-Level
Many times, local strategies can be combined at the goal level, without having to reason about possible choices of action for these goals. Of particular interest are negative relationships between goals that would result in a reduction in the number of goals that need subsequently be considered by the planner. Consider for example, the following relationships:
Suppression: The emergence of one goal subsumes another. This can be because one goal is a specialization of another, e.g. the need for an abdominal operation for unknown reasons versus the need for an abdominal operation to repair the duodenum; it can be because a certain treatment subsumes another, or renders it inappropriate, e.g. an ER thoracotomy will subsume any other diagnosis and/or treatment; with diagnostic goals, it can be because any information that can be acquired by any action aimed at one goal would also satisfy the other goal, e.g. an exploratory laparotomy will subsume some abdominal investigations. Inhibition or prioritization: The current pursuit of one goal inhibits or delays the pursuit of another, e.g. pursuit of abdominal bleeding as a possible cause of shock is inhibited in some patients if a possibility of tension pneumothorax has not yet been pursued. Note that the only di erence between inhibition and suppression is that an inhibited goal may be resumed after the inhibiting goal is satis ed. A special case is prioritization, when one goal should be pursued before another, e.g. treating a pneumothorax should often be pursued prior to treating an esophageal injury.
Such relationships are encoded in the ECM architecture using goal inhibition clauses which are then expanded into GDD rules, e.g. the desire to suppress g 2 in the presence of g 1 is expressed as: inhibit(g 2 ) = relevant(g 1 ) the desire that g 1 inhibits g 2 , until or unless g 1 is determined negative is expressed as:
inhibit(g 2 ) = relevant(g 1 )^:false(g 1 ) the desire to prioritize the pursuit of g 1 over that of g 2 is expressed as: inhibit(g 2 ) = relevant(g 1 )^:known(g 1 )
Additional prioritization information is encoded in goals' features, which are used to determine their respective ordering by the planner. For example, since a pneumothorax's priority is airway (cf. JR's case, Section 1), its diagnosis and treatment will usually precede that of an esophageal injury whose priority is contamination. In TraumAID 2.0's planning algorithm, such priorities translate into (a) preferred choice, in that procedures are rst chosen for higher-ranking goals, and (b) precedence, in that actions aimed at goals of higher priority/urgency are often scheduled ahead of others.
Combining in the Procedure/Action-Level
In TraumAID 2.0's planner, procedures and actions for concurrently pursued local strategies are merged in a selection-and-ordering algorithm using the following combination principles:
1. Preference for addressing one goal versus another as indicated by their relative urgency and priority. 2. Preference among alternative procedures for a given goal (assuming this goal is present alone). 3. Some restricted forms of preference among combinations of procedures for combinations of goals are speci ed via a cost measure that is used by the planner's parsimonious set-covering model. More complicated forms may require explicit speci cation either in GDD rules which manipulate goals, or in optimization transformations which are later applied to the plan. 4. Constraints and preferences on co-presence and ordering of several procedures within a plan can be speci ed for the planner's scheduling algorithm, e.g., based on the respective urgency and priority of the corresponding goals and based on the site in which a procedure is selected to be performed.
A Combination of Local Strategies in JR's Case
JR's management presents an interplay between several local strategies, e.g., diagnosis and treatment of a tension pneumothorax (cf. Example 6.2), diagnosis and treatment of a pericardial tamponade (cf. Example 5.3), general abdominal examination, treatment of a hemothorax, and others. First notice that the di erent strategies are triggered at di erent times during management and that each proceeds in a di erent pace. Also note that the combined strategy is not represented per se, but is rather implicitly and incrementally constructed via an on-going mediation between the local strategies.
Most of the explicit and implicit encoding mechanisms are represented in this single case, in particular:
1. The goal of inserting a chest tube for the right hemothorax is suppressed by the goal of operating on the chest;
2. The goals of investigating the pericardial sac and abdomen for causes of shock are inhibited/prioritized until after the investigation of a tension pneumothorax as an alternative explanation is completed;
3. Their respective features indicate that the goal of diagnosing a tension pneumothorax is more urgent and has a higher priority (airway vs. circulation) than the goal of investigating the abdomen;
4. The goal of diagnosing a pericardial tamponade can either be addressed with an ultrasound, or via a needle aspiration. This is the local order of preference. In JR's case, a needle aspiration is preferred due to the urgent nature of the injury.
5. Preference for a parsimonious combination of procedures for the combination of goals is exempli ed by the choice of a bilateral thoracotomy as a single operation that can be used to gain access to both the heart and the left chest;
6. Finally, the use of constraints in the on-line merging of local strategies is exemplied by the following:
Constraints based on goal features are exempli ed by ordering the aspiration of the chest prior to the aspiration of the pericardial sac. Another example, as per (3), is its ordering it prior to the abdominal X-ray studies; Constraints based on logistic considerations are exempli ed by scheduling the abdominal X-ray prior to the thoracic arteriogram. The arteriogram is later discarded, but at rst it is scheduled later because it requires access to machinery that is only available in the X-ray room, whereas an abdominal X-ray can be done in the ER; As mentioned, an example of constraints based on time/urgency is the selection of an otherwise less-preferable needle aspiration as a means of diagnosing a pericardial tamponade. The ultrasound, which is usually preferable, conicts with the urgency of this and other goals; Constraints that result in incompatibility (in this case a con ict between logistical and time constraints) are exempli ed in that the arteriogram, as well as the investigation of a potential esophageal injury, are not pursued at all once JR is transferred to the operating room.
7 General Strategies for Mixed Diagnosis-and-Repair
We have developed a framework which integrates diagnostic reasoning and planning, in an architecture for reasoning in exploratory-corrective domains. To support our claims regarding the suitability of our approach, we tried to identify important strategies from diagnosis-and-repair domains, in order to show that they can be encoded in this framework, and that indeed such encoding is natural. From an engineering perspective, identifying abstract forms of such strategies facilitates the creation of strategy templates for future use. From a scienti c perspective, this study has retrospectively resulted in an intriguing collection of diagnosis-and-repair strategies which will have to be dealt with by developers of other competing frameworks.
Scientists have studied diagnostic and therapeutic strategies for a variety of reasons. Many have studied medical decision making with the purpose of educating physicians 15, 16, 26, 28, 38] . Others, have studied such strategies with the objective of eventually teaching them to a machine, or of acquiring insights on how to encode medical knowledge in computerized decision support systems, e.g. 1, 3, 4, 34, 52].
The notion of strategy is clearly useful, and is sometimes explicitly present in medical management programs, e.g. the skeletal plans of oncocin 25, 31] and attending 36] . However, we found that diagnostic strategies are much better studied and documented than ones in which diagnosis and therapy are mixed. In 50], we show how the GDD/ECM framework can be used to encode what seems to be an agreed upon collection of primitive building blocks for diagnostic strategies, namely hypothesis generation, specialization, generalization, con rmation, and elimination. Here, we focus on strategies that represent important diagnosis-and-repair \philosophies". Although most of these strategies were originally identi ed in the trauma domain, we believe that the principles demonstrated in them are of general importance to decision making in exploratory-corrective domains, and maybe other domains as well.
The \Do No Harm" principle
A basic principle of medical diagnosis is avoiding the use of a diagnostic method whose consequences may be harsher than the diagnosed condition itself. For example, while a laparotomy can be used to diagnose renal injury, it would not be the method of choice for that purpose alone; rather a CT-scan or an IVP would typically be used. However, if a laparotomy is prescribed for other reasons then it is preferred not to spend extra time and e ort on a CT scan.
Encoding this example in GDD, three rules can be used to infer renal injury from each of the three alternative sources of information: CT-scan, IVP, and the surgical procedure. Choosing the means for addressing a renal injury suspicion, one must make sure that a surgical procedure is not chosen unless it is necessary anyway. One way to do so is to let the planner gure the most e cient method given the co-present injuries and associated goals. Alternatively, the diagnostic goal can simply be inhibited whenever a laparotomy is needed.
The \do no harm" principle extends to cases where the diagnostic method is harsher than the treatment of the diagnosed condition. For example, while herpes encephalitis can be diagnosed via a brain biopsy, it is less risky to prescribe a drug for its treatment and then observe the patient to see if it works (a form of empirical therapy) 12 .
Buying time
If a de nitive treatment requires an elaborate procedure that cannot be done immediately, there may sometimes be another procedure which although less e ective, is quick and can provide temporary relief. Buying time is particularly useful in patients su ering from multiple injuries, where it can allow diagnosis and treatment of other injuries. In an unstable patient su ering a tension pneumothorax, for example, temporary relief can be provided via decompressing the pressure. A more de nitive chest tube procedure, and if necessary an operation, can then follow. In TraumAID, such a strategy is encoded by separating two goal-setting rules: one for the urgent treatment and the other for the more de nitive one. The de nitive goal will only be instantiated after the urgent treatment has been accomplished.
In a slight twist, one may want to \buy time" for more accurate diagnosis. In a space station domain, for example, it may be easy to identify that air is leaking but hard to nd the precise cause of leakage. In the meantime, air can be temporarily added to maintain habitability and allow for further investigation 13 .
All roads lead to Rome
Sometimes, it may not be known which of two or more diseases is present. However, if both share the same treatment, then further di erentiation will have no e ect on the choice of action and by the GDD principle should thus be avoided. In case of abdominal injury, for example, it may sometimes be hard to determine which internal organs were injured. However, since they all require a laparotomy, the diagnostic process is ceased whenever one organ is determined to be injured. Furthermore, a laparotomy will also be called for if there is enough non-speci c evidence for intra abdominal injury. In GDD, that strategy is encoded via goal-inhibition rules.
Cover all bases
Related to the \All roads lead to Rome", is the strategy of treating all remaining hypotheses. Once left with a small set of such hypotheses, it may well pay to treat as if they were all present, rather than to re ne the diagnosis. This strategy was used by mycin 51] , where a set of antibiotics was chosen to cover all diagnoses above a certain threshold.
Gambling
It may not always be possible to carry out a diagnostic process to its end, or it may be too risky to do so. A decision may then have to ne made considering a number of competing hypotheses that have not yet been con rmed, nor eliminated. Utility theory tells us that for such a decision to be optimal, it should maximize the expected utility as measured by preferences over possible outcomes. Indeed, utilities have been used extensively in medical decision making (see 27, 39] for an excellent review). Following are a few strategies in which probabilistic and utility-based considerations seem to be involved:
Gamble on best scenario | Consider a patient presenting unconscious from shock with a suspected pericardial tamponade and/or lacerated abdominal aorta. In the presence of an adverse condition such as a distended abdomen, it may be too dangerous to try and di erentiate the two hypotheses; a de nitive action is required. As it turns, regardless of which condition is more believable, the correct strategy is to treat the patient as if s/he has a pericardial tamponade. The following table of likely outcomes justi es this choice; pericardial tamponade is the only survivable injury.
Patient has
Pericardial Lacerated Tamponade Aorta  Pericardial  Administering Tamponade  lives  dies  treatment for Lacerated  Aorta  dies  dies In GDD, this strategy can be encoded by setting the goal of treating a pericardial tamponade and letting this goal override both diagnostic goals. That way, we do not conclude the presence of a pericardial tamponade, but rather the need to treat as if it was present.
Picking order of attention { Consider an unstable patient with a stab wound to the lower chest. The cause of shock, which could be one of tension pneumothorax (due to collapse of the lungs), pericardial tamponade (due to bleeding in the pericardial sac), or abdominal shock (due to internal bleeding in the abdomen), must be urgently removed. With insu cient information, since each of the di erent alternative causes requires a di erent treatment and since these treatments cannot be pursued concurrently, we must sequentially try one treatment at a time until the shock is relieved. Of course, the order in which the various hypotheses are tried is important. In practice, the order in which treatments are tried depends on accompanying signs, and on the expected outcome of the decision, roughly following an informal utilitytheoretic decision process.
Note that while the goals instantiated in this process are typically diagnostic, the procedures that are recommended are therapeutic in nature, with the diagnostic side-e ect of con rming or rejecting the hypothesis, depending on their outcome. For example, a needle aspiration of the chest will be ordered for the diagnosis of a tension pneumothorax, thereby also providing an indication as to whether (a) the condition was present, and (b) was the sole source of shock. Thus, this procedure mixes diagnosis and therapy in a reverse order: a condition is diagnosed after, and as a result of its treatment.
Gambling strategies are considerably a ected by the utilities attached to various outcomes. Naturally, such utilities are patient-speci c, and thus, the appropriate strategy may di er from one patient to another. The treatment of spinal cord trauma with steroids, for example, may improve the chances of the patient walking again, but may also cause complications, and even death, in certain patients. In trauma management, using patient-speci c utilities is complicated by the fact that patients can often not be asked for their preference.
Treating causal chains
Chain e ects are common in physical systems. For example, a gunshot wound to the back may result in an injury to the aorta. Then, blood accumulating in the chest cavity (hemothorax) may result in shock. On such occasions, one has to decide which to address rst: the problem (e.g. the hemothorax), or its cause(s) (e.g. the injured aorta). More generally, given a causal chain, one has to decide which problems on the chain to address rst. Unfortunately, there is no single recipe. Such a decision is a ected by a number of factors. For example:
While our validation studies have shown that TraumAID 2.0 is able to produce management plans of acceptable quality, there remains the issue of how to communicate information about those plans to physicians engaged in patient care in such a way as to actually a ect their behavior and, potentially, the outcome of cases. Physicians exposed to an earlier version of TraumAID complained that the plans produced by the system were often very similar, if not identical, to what they were planning to do anyway. For this system to be of use to them they would have to look through a great deal of information they did not need, to nd the items that could help them. In response to this problem, Abigail Gertner has developed TraumaTIQ, a critiquing interface to the TraumAID system 21, 22] . The design of TraumaTIQ is based on the philosophy that physicians (or anyone) engaged in time-critical activities that require a great deal of attention should only be interrupted by a decision-support system if it appears that they are about to commit an error. This both reduces the amount of the physician's attention required by the system, and ensures that the information produced is relevant to his or her intended plan. During a case, TraumaTIQ monitors the procedures ordered by the physician to be carried out. Through a process of plan recognition and plan evaluation, TraumaTIQ identi es potentially signi cant errors of omission and commission, as well as ine ciencies in the physician's plan. Critiques regarding these errors are expressed as English sentences.
